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Abstract 
We propose a new system of financing long-term care services in the United 
States. Our plan expands Medicare to cover comprehensive long-term care 
services, including home care and custodial nursing home care. Beneficiaries 
would share in the cost of services through deductibles and copayments, but 
the program would include stop loss coverage and special protections for low-
income adults. By providing long-term care insurance that actually protects the 
assets of older adults, our proposal would eliminate the disincentive to save 
inherent in the means-tested Medicaid system. Our plan would also remove the 
bias in the current system for institutional care, enabling more persons with 
disabilities to remain at home where most prefer to live. We propose to finance 
this expansion of Medicare benefits with a surcharge on federal income taxes. 
Unlike the regressive payroll tax that finances Medicare’s hospitalization 
coverage, the surcharge we propose would not increase tax burdens for low-
income individuals or families. All of the revenue generated by the tax would be 
dedicated to a special Medicare trust fund that would finance future long-term 
care services.  
Introduction 
The financing of long-term care services for elderly adults is a critical public 
policy issue. As baby boomers age, the number of older Americans will soar 
over the next few decades. Between 2000 and 2040, the population aged 65 and 
older will almost double, to 77.2 million, while the population aged 85 and 
older will more than triple, to 14.3 million (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). Despite 
recent improvements in health at older ages (Manton and Gu 2001; Freedman et 
al. 2004), many elderly Americans will continue to need assistance with basic 
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 personal care. The Congressional Budget Office (1999, 2004) estimates that the 
number of Americans aged 65 and older with long-term care needs will increase 
from 8.8 million in 2000 to at least 12.1 million in 2040.  
The family has traditionally been an important provider of care to the 
frail elderly. Most older persons with disabilities live in the community, not in 
nursing homes (Feder, Komisar, and Niefeld 2000), and receive care from 
spouses and adult children (Johnson and Wiener 2006). The availability of 
informal care is a critical factor in enabling frail elders to live independently in 
the community (LoSasso and Johnson 2002). However, it is unlikely that family 
caregivers alone can meet the expected rise in long-term care needs. Women are 
much more likely than men to provide care to their parents (Mui 1995), but 
many are being forced to reduce the amount of time they devote to caregiving 
activities as more and more women enter the labor force. And declining fertility 
rates may limit the number of adult children who will be available to provide 
care to their parents in the future. As a result, an increasing number of older 
adults may rely on paid helpers in the next few decades, either at home or in 
institutions, to meet their long-term care needs. 
Despite the growing importance of formal long-term care services in the 
United States, there are significant problems with the way in which they are 
now financed. Most nursing home costs are paid by the public sector today. 
Although this is clearly a boon for frail elderly Americans, the availability of 
public funds for long-term care services discourages individuals from preparing 
for their own long-term care needs when they are young and healthy. Medicaid 
eligibility rules impose a nearly 100 percent tax on income and assets for 
nursing home residents. This implicit tax may be an important factor behind 
the alarmingly low savings rate for middle-class Americans. The current system 
also favors institutional care over home- and community-based services, which 
are not as heavily subsidized as nursing home services. 
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 Private insurance is available for long-term care expenses, but coverage 
rates are very low. Adults may be reluctant to purchase long-term care policies 
because Medicaid will pay for expenses that exceed their financial resources. 
Other problems with the private market for long-term care insurance include 
benefits that often turn out to be inadequate to cover future expenses, high 
load factors, large year-to-year premium increases and resultant high 
nonrenewal rates, and serious adverse selection problems.  
To remedy the problems with the current system, we propose expanding 
Medicare to cover comprehensive long-term care services, including home care 
and custodial nursing home care. Beneficiaries would share in the cost of 
services through deductibles and copayments, but the program would include 
stop loss coverage and special protections for low-income adults. By providing 
long-term care insurance that actually protects the assets of older adults, our 
proposal would eliminate the disincentive to save inherent in the means-tested 
Medicaid system. Our plan would also remove the bias in the current system in 
favor of institutional care, enabling more persons with disabilities to remain at 
home where most prefer to live. We propose to finance this expansion of 
Medicare benefits with a surcharge on federal income taxes. Unlike the 
regressive payroll tax that finances Medicare’s hospitalization coverage, the 
surcharge we propose would not increase tax burdens for low-income 
individuals or families. All of the revenue generated by the tax would be 
dedicated to a special Medicare trust fund that would finance future long-term 
care services.  
The Current System for Financing Long-Term Care Services  
The cost of long-term care is high and growing. Nursing home care in a semi-
private room now costs $183 per day on average, or nearly $67,000 per year 
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 (Metlife Mature Market Institute 2006).1 Spending from all public and private 
sources for long-term care totaled about $207 billion in 2005 (Komisar and 
Thompson 2007). Real nursing home and home health costs nearly quadrupled 
between 1980 and 2005 (Levit et al. 2002; Poisal et al. 2007), and a recent study 
projects that costs could quadruple again by 2050 (Tilly, Goldenson, and Kasten 
2001). These figures exclude the value of informal care from family and friends, 
who provide most of the help received by those with disabilities. According to 
one estimate, annual long-term care spending would increase by about $200 
billion if paid helpers provided the services now offered by informal caregivers 
(Arno, Levine, and Memmott 1999).  
Medicaid 
A combination of public and private sources finance long-term care services. 
Medicaid is the single largest payer of long-term care costs, financing 49 
percent of total expenses in 2005 (Komisar and Thompson 2007). It covers 
institutional care and home health services for eligible adults who cannot pay 
the full cost themselves. All states also offer Medicaid beneficiaries home- and 
community-based care services, which provide a variety of nonmedical and 
social services and supports designed to enable persons with disabilities to 
remain in the community. These Medicaid services, provided under waiver 
authority granted by the Department of Health and Human Services, have 
grown rapidly in recent years.2 In 2003, spending for the waiver programs 
reached $19 billion, nearly double the amount spent in 1998 (Government 
Accountability Office 2005). Nonetheless, most Medicaid spending for the aged 
and disabled is still devoted to institutional care, not care received at home or 
                                         
1 Costs are even higher in some parts of the country. In New York City, for example, the annual cost of a 
semi- private room in a nursing home averaged about $120,000 in 2006 (Metlife Mature Market Institute 
2006).  
2 Under section 1915(c) of the Social Security Act, states may request waivers of certain federal 
requirements to develop Medicaid- financed community- based treatment alternatives. The first home and 
community- based waiver program was established in 1981, and there are currently about 287 programs 
in effect, covering every state except Arizona, which provides similar Medicaid services to its eligible 
residents through a federal demonstration program (CMS 2007).  
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 in the community. In 2005, 63 percent of Medicaid long-term care expenditures 
paid for services in nursing homes and intermediate care facilities (Summer 
2007). 
Although Medicaid provides fairly comprehensive long-term care 
services, individuals must meet strict income and asset tests to qualify for 
coverage. The eligibility rules are complex and vary by state. In most states 
aged or disabled adults who receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
automatically qualify for Medicaid. In 2007, the federal SSI limits for individuals 
are $623 per month in countable income and $2,000 in countable assets.3 (For 
couples, the monthly limits are $934 in income and $3,000 in assets.) Some 
states impose even more stringent limits for Medicaid participation, 
corresponding to the eligibility rules for cash assistance programs for the aged 
and disabled in place before the introduction of the SSI program in 1972.  
In most states, individuals who do not qualify for SSI may still receive 
long-term care services through Medicaid. Federal regulations allow state 
Medicaid programs to pay for long-term care services for individuals with 
incomes up to 300 percent of the federal SSI benefit (or $1,869 per month in 
2007). The “300 percent rule” for nursing home care exists in 31 states, and 
another four states use income thresholds for Medicaid-financed nursing home 
care that are between 100 percent and 300 percent of the federal SSI benefit 
(Kassner and Shirey 2000). In a few states, an individual may have more than 
$2,000 in assets and still qualify for long-term care services. Most states apply 
the same limits to determine eligibility for home- and community based 
services.  
                                         
3 Countable income excludes $20 per month in unearned income, $65 per month in earnings plus one-
half of monthly earnings in excess of $65, the value of food stamps and rent subsidies, and state and 
locally funded need- based assistance. Countable assets generally exclude the value of owner- occupied 
housing, an automobile used to obtain medical treatment, certain burial funds, and up to $2,000 in 
personal effects. 
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 Individuals with incomes and assets too high to qualify for long-term 
care services may “spend down” to Medicaid eligibility and receive benefits. In 
fact, about one-third of discharged nursing home residents admitted as private 
pay residents had spent down to Medicaid by the time of their discharge 
(Wiener, Sullivan, and Skaggs 1996). Most state Medicaid programs include 
medically needy provisions, which exclude medical and long-term care 
expenses from income when determining program eligibility. However, the 
income thresholds in medically needy cases are lower than the SSI income 
thresholds. Medicaid applicants who live in states that do not offer medically 
needy programs and whose pension and social security incomes exceed the 
Medicaid eligibility standards can still qualify for long-term care services by 
assigning their incomes to special trusts, called qualified income trusts or 
Miller trusts. These trusts release to the applicants income equal to one dollar 
less than the income eligibility threshold and directs the remainder of the 
payment to the facility or care provider.  
Medicaid pays for long-term care services only after eligible users have 
exhausted almost all of their resources on their long-term care costs. Aside 
from income they may protect for a community-dwelling spouse, Medicaid 
nursing home residents may keep only a small personal needs allowance. By 
federal law, this allowance must be at least $30 per month, and may not exceed 
$90 per month. Participants in waiver programs that provide home- and 
community-based services may keep substantially more of their income to 
cover the expense of living in the community. The maintenance needs 
allowance, as it is called, varies by state, ranging from 100 percent to 300 
percent of the SSI benefit amount (Kassner and Shirey 2000).  
Medicaid law requires states to protect the income and assets of spouses 
of Medicaid nursing home residents. Community-dwelling spouses are entitled 
to all of the income received in their own names and half of the income they 
receive jointly with their spouses, plus half of the value of assets held by both 
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 spouses combined. However, states must also establish minimum levels of 
assets and income that the community spouses can keep even if their resource 
shares fall short of these levels. The 2007 minimum monthly income allowance 
for spouses must be at least $1,650, about twice the federal poverty level for 
single people, while the minimum asset allowance is $20,328. States can raise 
minimum allowances for spouses, but they cannot exceed $2,541 in monthly 
income or $101,640 in assets (in 2007).  
Medicare 
Some public funding for long-term care comes from Medicare, but it plays a 
relatively small role, paying only about 20 percent of the nation’s long-term 
care expenses in 2005 (Komisar and Thompson 2007). Medicare covers only 
temporary stays in certified skilled nursing facilities that follow 
hospitalizations. It does not cover custodial care. In addition, Medicare 
coverage ends after 100 days of nursing home care. Medicare does not charge 
beneficiaries copayments for the first 20 days, but requires daily copayments of 
$124 (in 2007) for the last 80 days of coverage.  
Medicare also provides limited home health care benefits. It covers 
medically necessary skilled nursing care, physical therapy, speech language 
services, and occupational therapy for homebound beneficiaries. Beneficiaries 
do not need to make copayments. Medicare home health care spending peaked 
at $17.9 billion in 1997, more than double the 1992 level, but then declined to 
$8.7 billion in 2001 after cost-cutting initiatives in the 1997 Balanced Budget 
Act and efforts to reduce fraud and abuse (MEDPAC 2006). Spending has 
rebounded somewhat in recent years, rising to $12.5 billion in 2005. 
Private Long-term Care Insurance 
Private insurance is also available to cover long-term care expenses. It generally 
pays up to a specified amount for nursing home and home health care, typically 
about $100 per day (LifePlans Inc. 2000). Policyholders must, however, meet the 
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 policy’s disability criteria before they can receive benefits. Nearly all plans now 
sold allow policyholders to collect payments only if they are severely 
cognitively impaired or need assistance with at least two activities of daily 
living (America’s Health Insurance Plans 2004). Policies differ in terms of the 
duration of benefits they provide, the length of the waiting period before 
benefits are paid, the availability of partial benefits for policyholders who let 
their coverage lapse, and the availability of inflation escalators. Inflation 
protection can be especially important for those who purchase their policies in 
midlife, perhaps 25 or more years before they are likely to incur long-term care 
costs. However, only about 4 in 10 new policyholders purchased inflation 
protection in 2000 (Cohen, Weinrobe, and Miller 2002). 
Long-term care insurance premiums can be substantial and increase 
rapidly with age at time of issue. For example, for a policy providing up to four 
years of benefits, with a $150 daily benefit and a 90-day waiting period but no 
inflation protection, the 2002 average annual premium was $422 for 40-year-
old purchasers (America’s Health Insurance Plans 2004). The average annual 
premium for the same policy was $564 at age 50, $1,337 at age 65, and $5,330 
at age 79. Once a plan is purchased, premiums do not increase with age, 
although an insurer can raise premiums for an entire class of policyholders 
based on their claims experience. Taxpayers who itemize deductions may 
deduct long-term care insurance premiums for qualifying policies from taxable 
income to the extent that they (plus other unreimbursed medical expenses) 
exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income. Premiums may also be paid from 
health savings accounts on a tax-free basis. 
Private long-term care insurance coverage has grown rapidly in recent 
years. About 9 million policies had been sold by the end of 2002, up from fewer 
than 1 million in 1987 (America’s Health Insurance Plans 2004). Nonetheless, 
coverage rates remain low. Only about 9 percent of Americans aged 55 and 
older had private long-term care insurance coverage in 2002 (Johnson and 
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 Uccello 2005). Some employers, including the federal government, offer 
workers the opportunity to purchase long-term care insurance at group rates, 
but employers do not generally contribute toward premiums and few 
employees participate. According to one study, the median participation rate 
among active employees across a random sample of firms offering long-term 
care insurance was only 3 percent in 1998 (Lutzky, Corea, and Alecxih 2000). In 
2005, private insurance paid only 7 percent of long-term care costs (Komisar 
and Thompson 2007).  
Because of limited public and private benefits, many long-term care costs 
are paid out of pocket by care recipients and their families. In 2005, out-of-
pocket payments accounted for 18 percent of all long-term care costs (Komisar 
and Thompson 2007). These out-of-pocket payments can be a significant 
burden. According to data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), the 
median out-of-pocket payment to nursing homes during the two-year period 
between 2000 and 2002 totaled $15,000 among nursing home residents who 
made payments.4 One-quarter of residents who make out-of-pocket payments 
spent more than $52,000.  
Limitations of the Current System 
The current system does not finance long-term care services in an efficient or 
fair way. Many families would be better off if they could insure themselves 
against the risk of catastrophic long-term care expenses. However, many adults 
with long-term care needs are forced to rely on Medicaid, which provides 
benefits only after they have exhausted all of their financial resources. Recent 
Medicaid reforms have increased the level of income and assets that are 
reserved for spouses, in an effort to provide better financial security for the 
community-dwelling husbands and wives of nursing home residents, but the 
                                         
4 Estimates are based on the authors’ tabulations. For more information on the HRS, a nationally 
representative survey of older Americans visit http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/. 
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 available evidence suggests that these reforms have not substantially improved 
the economic security of spouses remaining in the community (Norton and 
Kumar 2000). Moreover, the program is not designed to protect the assets of 
those receiving long-term care services. It leaves them with nothing to pass on 
to their heirs and impoverishes those who return to the community after 
temporary nursing home stays. 
Medicaid penalizes those who save for their old age, because it imposes a 
100 percent tax on most assets for those who receive long-term care through 
the program (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995). The savings rate in the U.S. is 
among the lowest of all industrialized nations. In 2005 and 2006, the U.S. 
personal savings rate was negative, with personal outlays exceeding disposable 
personal income (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2006). And most Americans do 
not accumulate much non-housing wealth outside of Social Security and 
employer-sponsored retirement plans. For example, median household financial 
wealth excluding retirement plans for adults aged 55 to 64 was only $12,000 in 
2004.5  
Another disadvantage of the current system is that Medicaid can distort 
the choice between home- and institutional-based care. Most older adults prefer 
to remain in their own homes, instead of moving to nursing homes (AARP 
2003). But despite recent improvements, Medicaid rules still make it difficult 
for frail older adults to receive subsidized care at home. The growth in waiver 
programs that provide home- and community-based services has expanded 
long-term care options for many adults with disabilities, but federal law 
stipulates that the introduction of these programs must not increase Medicaid 
spending. This condition has forced states to limit eligibility for Medicaid-
financed home- and community-based care and impose other requirements to 
limit costs. As a result, some enrollees in the waiver program cannot afford to 
                                         
5 Estimates are based on the authors’ tabulations. 
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 remain in the community because the monthly stipend that the program allows 
is too small to cover their living expenses. 
The current system also imposes substantial burdens on state 
governments. Medicaid is a joint federal-state program, with the federal 
government paying most of the costs. Nonetheless, states end up financing a 
sizable portion of Medicaid expenses. Medicaid is the second-largest category of 
state spending from general funds, behind elementary and secondary 
education, accounting for about 17 percent of total fiscal year 2005 general 
fund expenditures (National Association of State Budget Officers 2006).6 
According to a 2002 survey, many state Medicaid directors attribute a 
substantial portion of the recent increase in Medicaid spending to the rising 
cost of long-term care (Smith et al 2002).7 The same survey reported that a 
number of states are considering steps to reduce long-term care costs, 
including changing facility bed hold policies, instituting new reimbursement 
methodologies, shutting down nursing homes, and requiring that long-term 
care facilities have dual Medicare and Medicaid certification.  
Private long-term care insurance has a number of attractive features 
which, if coverage became more widespread, might address many of the 
problems with the current system. For example, unlike federal and state 
governments, private insurers must set aside financial reserves to cover future 
claims. As a result, higher levels of long-term care insurance coverage would 
increase the pool of savings available to pay for future long-term care services. 
In addition, competition among insurance companies could keep premiums at a 
reasonable level. With proper reforms, private insurance would better protect 
                                         
6 However, Medicaid is the largest category of state spending overall, accounting for nearly 23 percent of 
all fiscal year 2005 expenditures (National Association of State Budget Officers 2006). Federal funds cover 
a large share of state Medicaid costs. 
7 Survey respondents most often cited increases in the cost of prescription drugs as a significant factor in 
the growth in Medicaid expenditures. 
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 the income and assets of recipients of long-term care. Legislation might be 
needed, however, to mandate that policies provide inflation protection. 
Despite these advantages, however, it seems unlikely that private 
insurance could ever finance long-term care for more than a small minority of 
older Americans. Many older adults are simply unable to afford long-term care 
insurance. For example, in 2004 21 percent of married couples aged 55 to 61 
had incomes below $40,000, and 40 percent of unmarried adults had incomes 
below $25,000 (Social Security Administration 2006). It is unlikely that these 
adults could afford to purchase long-term care insurance. Affordability is an 
even more serious problem for those who delay purchasing coverage until older 
ages, when annual premiums are much higher. Among those aged 70 to 74, 60 
percent of unmarried adults had incomes below $25,000 in 2000. Some studies 
have found that only 10 to 20 percent of older adults could afford to purchase 
long-term care coverage (General Accounting Office 2000).  
Many who can afford to purchase coverage discover later that they are 
unable to maintain their premium payments and let their policies lapse after a 
few years. Plans often lack nonforfeiture benefits, which provide partial 
benefits for those who let their policies lapse. As a result, some who fail to 
renew their policies receive nothing in return for their premium payments, 
because most policyholders do not use long-term care services until very late in 
life.  
Those with health problems have special difficulty purchasing long-term 
care insurance. Medical underwriting of policies increases premiums for those 
in poor health, making their coverage even less affordable. Some in especially 
poor health may be unable to purchase coverage at any price.  
A related problem is adverse selection, which can undermine the private 
insurance market. At a given premium level, those who expect to use many 
services are more likely to purchase coverage than those who anticipate lower 
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 usage. As high-cost users dominate the pool of policyholders, insurers need to 
raise premiums to cover their claims. But raising premiums discourages more 
low-cost users from purchasing coverage, leading to even higher premiums. 
This “death spiral,” as it is sometimes called, can cause private insurance 
markets to break down. A single payer system, such as Medicare, eliminates 
this problem. 
A final challenge for a system of voluntary private insurance is how to 
treat those who elect not to purchase coverage. Some type of safety net, such as 
Medicaid, is vital, because a compassionate society demands that every frail 
adult receive at least a minimal level of care. The presence of a safety net, 
however, discourages some people from purchasing costly private insurance. 
This “free rider problem” raises important fairness issues about who receives 
free care in a system of voluntary private insurance.  
Expanding Medicare to Provide Comprehensive Long-Term Care 
Services 
To overcome many of the limitations of the current system, we propose 
expanding Medicare to cover comprehensive long-term care services. It would 
provide benefits to all disabled Americans and those aged 65 and older who 
need long-term care services, and would include special protections for low-
income adults. It would be financed by a surcharge on individual income taxes 
that would be paid by all taxpayers once the plan is fully phased in. 
Medicare Part E 
Our plan would add a new component to the Medicare system, which we call 
Medicare Part E. It would cover all nursing home care, including skilled nursing 
and rehabilitation care as well as custodial care that provides assistance with 
activities of daily living. It would also cover home care, including both medical 
services (as currently provided) and custodial care. Our proposal would move 
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 coverage of home health care and skilled nursing facility care that Medicare 
currently provides out of Parts A and B and into Part E.  
Coverage under Part E would begin at age 65 or the age at which younger 
individuals with disabilities qualify for Medicare Part A. Like Part A, but unlike 
Part B, coverage would not require monthly premiums, because beneficiaries 
would have already contributed to their coverage through an income tax 
surcharge paid throughout most of their adult lives (as described in more detail 
below). Because the long-term care benefits would be financed through an 
income tax, not a payroll tax, eligibility would not depend on one’s work history 
or a spouse’s work history. Thus Part E would cover all Americans aged 65 and 
older, including the few elderly adults without Part A coverage.  
Our proposal restricts benefits to those who can demonstrate a medical 
need for supportive services at home or in a nursing home. To qualify for 
services, beneficiaries would need medical certification that they are severely 
cognitively impaired or that they have limitations in at least two activities of 
daily living. Our proposal eliminates the current restriction that beneficiaries 
must be homebound to qualify for Medicare-financed home health care. 
Because the program would be phased in over time and all adults currently on 
Medicare would continue to qualify for the current package of benefits, no one 
currently receiving long-term care through Medicare would lose benefits. We 
would not limit the type, amount or duration of services that beneficiaries 
could receive in a nursing home. Part E would cover all reasonable types of 
home care services, but would pay for no more than 100 hours of services per 
month.  
We propose an annual deductible of $500 for all Part E services 
combined. The deductible would rise each year by the percentage change in the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI), rounded to the nearest $50. In addition, 
beneficiaries would be responsible for 20 percent copayments for Medicare Part 
E services. However, our proposal also includes stop loss coverage to protect 
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 those with significant long-term care needs, since expenses for nursing home 
and home care services can mount quickly. We propose to cap copayments at 
$5,000 per year. This spending limit would be indexed for inflation based on 
the CPI.  
Many low-income adults could not afford the cost-sharing requirements 
we propose, even with stop loss protection. However, they could receive help 
with deductibles and copayments from state Medicaid offices through the 
current Qualified Medicare Beneficiaries (QMB) program, available to Medicare 
beneficiaries with incomes below the federal poverty level (or $851 per month 
for single adults and $1,141 per month for married couples in 2007) and 
countable assets below 200 percent of the SSI limits (currently $4,000 for single 
adults and $6,000 for married couples). Since this program is already in place, 
it provides an administratively simple way of extending special protections to 
low-income adults with long-term care needs. One drawback, however, is that 
relatively few eligible beneficiaries currently participate in these programs 
(Moon, Brennan, and Segal 1998).  
As under the current system, our proposal envisions a mix of private and 
public health care providers offering long-term care services and receiving 
reimbursement from Medicare. We anticipate a prospective payment system for 
long-term care services, similar to that currently in place for skilled nursing 
facilities and home health agencies that provide Medicare-financed services. 
Under our plan, nursing homes would receive a set per diem rate for each 
Medicare patient, adjusted for local wages and the level of services the patient 
is likely to require, based on the level of impairment. Home care providers 
would receive a fixed payment for each type of home visit, with adjustments for 
local labor market conditions. 
An expansion of the Medicare program to cover more long-term care 
services would generate a windfall for state governments. Shifting many long-
term care costs out of the Medicaid system would substantially reduce health 
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 care bills paid by the states. Under the current system, states assume 
responsibility for up to one-half of long-term care costs incurred by virtually all 
low-income elderly and disabled individuals. Under our proposal, states would 
pay long-term care costs for only those low-income individuals who do not 
qualify for Medicare—primarily individuals with developmental disabilities—
and they would pay Medicare deductibles and copayments for low-income 
people in the QMB program. States would welcome a reduction in their 
Medicaid costs, given the problems they cause for state budgets, but the long-
term federal budget outlook is also quite bleak, so this shift in burden may not 
be feasible.8 Congress could offset states’ long-term care savings by raising the 
share of costs paid by the states for other Medicaid services. 
Financing 
The goal of our financing scheme is to fully fund the portion of long-term care 
costs that would currently be paid by the private sector in a way that 
approximates the current distribution of expected long-term care costs over a 
lifetime, and do it in a way that does not discourage people from saving. At 
present, low-income people pay relatively little for their long-term care costs 
because most are paid by Medicaid. Middle- and upper-income people pay a 
share of those costs that tends to increase with income because of the spend-
down provisions to qualify for Medicaid. High-income people pay all or most of 
their costs, either directly or via private long-term care insurance, because they 
have too much assets and income to qualify for Medicaid. 
We propose to finance Medicare Part E from a combination of general 
revenues (to pay for the portion of such expenditures currently paid by the 
public sector) and an income tax surcharge (to pay for the currently private 
                                         
8 The Congressional Budget Office (2005) projects that outlays for Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security 
will rise from 9 percent of GDP in 2007 to 19 percent in 2050 under its intermediate spending scenario 
(which assumes slower growth in health care costs). By comparison, federal tax revenues have averaged 
about 18 percent of GDP over the past 50 years. 
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 portion). In principle, one could design a surcharge that, over a lifetime, very 
closely matched each individual’s expected long-term care costs, but it would 
not be practical. Such a tax scheme could be quite complex, depending on age, 
income, family status, and assets. And there is no good evidence on what 
younger individuals can expect to spend for their long-term care costs over 
their lifetime. We contend, however, that a simple flat-rate surcharge appears to 
be a fair proxy for expected out-of-pocket costs under current law, and it would 
be simple to administer.9
For illustrative purposes, our proposal includes an across-the-board 
increase in individual tax rates equal to one percentage point. The actual rate 
would have to be set so as to achieve long-run actuarial balance. Were our plan 
in place for the 2007 tax year, the lowest marginal tax rates, for taxable income 
below $7,825 for single households and $15,650 for married households filing 
jointly, would rise from 10 percent to 11 percent, while the top marginal rate, 
for taxable income in excess of $349,700, would rise from 35 percent to 36 
percent. The surcharge would also apply to the special lower tax rates on 
capital gains and dividends, currently capped at 15 percent. They would 
increase to a maximum of 16 percent under the proposal.  
If this surcharge were fully phased-in in 2007, it would have generated 
about $55 billion in revenue, based on the Tax Policy Center microsimulation 
model.10 The trust fund financed by the income tax surcharge would also 
generate additional revenue. By comparison, total private long-term care costs 
(not counting the value of caregivers’ time) was about $58 billion in 2005 
(Komisar and Thompson 2007), and not all of that would have been reimbursed 
                                         
 
9 There are some complexities for the Treasury Department, which would be required to estimate the 
share of income tax receipts attributable to the surcharge and make transfers to the long- term care trust 
fund in real time. Those complexities, however, are no more daunting than Treasury’s current obligation 
to estimate revenues from the taxation of Social Security benefits, which are allocated to the Social 
Security and Medicare trust funds. 
10 Official revenue estimates for the proposal would be lower, because government estimators would 
assume that the higher tax rates would lead to more tax avoidance and thus produce some offsetting 
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 by our proposal, so the one-percent surcharge appears to be in the right 
ballpark. 
A federal income tax surcharge would be more equitable than the current 
payroll tax that is used to finance Social Security and Medicare Part A. The 
current payroll tax is split between employers and employees, with each party 
paying 6.2 percent of earnings to the Social Security trust fund and 1.45 
percent of earnings to the Medicare Part A trust fund. Most economists believe 
that workers bear the entire burden of the payroll tax, meaning that employers 
reduce wages to offset the payroll taxes they pay to the government. Thus, the 
existing payroll tax reduces wages by a total of 15.3 percent. Other types of 
income, such as capital gains, profits from businesses, and interest, dividend, 
and rental income, are exempt from this tax. With a federal income tax 
surcharge, most sources of income would be subject to the special tax, 
spreading the burden of funding long-term care services more equally across 
the population.11
The current payroll tax is regressive, in that the average tax rate falls with 
income. High-income taxpayers derive a relatively large share of their income 
from non-wage sources, such as assets, which are not subject to the payroll tax. 
In addition, under current rules, annual earnings in excess of a certain amount 
are not subject to Social Security taxes (although they are subject to the 
Medicare tax). This threshold, which increases each year by the percentage 
change in the average wage, is $97,500 in 2007. Because high wages are exempt 
from the tax, low-wage workers pay a larger share of their earnings in Social 
Security taxes than high-wage workers. In fact, three-quarters of filers pay more 
in payroll tax than in income tax (Gale and Rohaly 2003). An income tax 
surcharge would be more progressive. Even though all income groups would 
                                                                                                                                 
revenue leakage. This behavioral response, however, would be largely irrelevant to the estimate of how 
much money should be allocated to the trust fund. 
11 However, the federal income tax does exempt some types of income, such as fringe benefits, 
contributions and earnings of retirement plans, and public assistance. 
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 face the same increase in tax rate bracket, the individual federal income tax 
excludes the first several thousand dollars of income from taxation.12 With an 
income tax surcharge, then, those better able to pay would make larger 
contributions to the financing of long-term care services. 
Overall, the bottom 40 percent of households would owe very little tax. 
(See Table 1.13) Assuming that the tax had been in place forever in 2007—so 
that everyone is subject to it—one-third would owe no additional tax at all. The 
bottom quintile would pay virtually nothing, because few of them owe income 
tax. The second quintile would contribute about 2 percent of overall revenues, 
paying an average tax of $38 per year. The middle quintile would contribute 
more—8 percent—but the overall contribution would amount to only one-half 
of one percent of their income (an average of $147 per year). The fourth 
quintile would contribute slightly less than their proportional share—almost 19 
percent—but the tax would still amount to only 0.7 percent of income (or $344 
on average). In contrast, the top quintile pays 71 percent of the tax. The average 
tax for the top 1 percent of households would be about $10,196. This pattern is 
appropriate as high-income households have the most to gain from a system 
that does not require them to exhaust their assets before qualifying for 
governmental assistance to pay for long-term care, but it will probably exceed 
the amount that they expect to gain, especially for those with very high 
incomes. Thus, this financing mechanism includes some redistribution from the 
very wealthy to the middle class. 
Because they have less taxable income and qualify for a larger standard 
deduction, more than 57 percent of households headed by someone aged 65 or 
                                         
12 In 2007, a single filer could earn $8,750 before owing tax; a married couple, $17,500; and a couple with 
two children, $24,300 (Tax Policy Center 2007). Filers aged 65 and over qualify for an additional standard 
deduction of $1,150 for a single older filer and $1,050 for each spouse filing a joint return who is at least 
65 years of age ($2,100 for a qualifying couple). Tax credits can raise the filing threshold further for some 
households, especially those with children (Burman, Maag, and Rohaly 2002). 
13 For more detail, as well as estimates by dollar income classes (rather than percentiles), see tables T07-
0103 and T07- 0104 for all households and tables T07- 0105 and T07- 0106 for households headed by 
someone aged 65 or over, available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/estimates. 
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 over would owe no additional tax under the fully phased in proposal (table 2). 
The average tax for senior citizens would be $264 per year, 29 percent less than 
the average tax collected from the whole population.  
Because Part E benefits would replace some benefits provided under Parts 
A and B, our proposed Medicare expansion could allow lawmakers to reduce the 
taxes and premiums that finance the existing Medicare system. Nursing home 
and home health costs accounted for 15.6 percent of total Part A payments in 
2002 and 5.2 percent of total Part B payments (CMS 2006). Thus, by moving all 
of these costs to Part E, our proposal could lead to a reduction in the Hospital 
Insurance payroll tax that funds Part A from 1.45 percent (paid by both 
employers and employees) to 1.22 percent. Or lawmakers could choose to 
maintain the current tax rate to improve the trust fund’s long-run solvency. Our 
proposal would similarly allow Congress to reduce the monthly premiums that 
beneficiaries pay for Part B coverage, or use the additional revenues to add 
years of solvency to the program. 
Revenue raised by the income tax surcharge would be set aside in a 
special trust fund, dedicated to financing Medicare Part E services. The trust 
fund would be invested in nongovernmental securities, so that revenues raised 
would be exactly offset by outlays and could thus not be used to mask budget 
deficits. Income earned on trust fund balances would also be totally outside 
budgetary accounts, and therefore less susceptible to diversion. This trust fund 
would create a pool of savings that could be used to meet future long-term care 
needs, something that is missing from the current system.  
Transition Period 
We propose to phase in our reforms gradually over time. This would allow the 
Part E trust fund to accumulate substantial reserves before it begins to make 
payouts. It also would treat different birth cohorts fairly. For example, 
members of earlier birth cohorts who have already purchased private long-term 
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 care insurance should not also have to contribute to a public insurance 
program, while those who never contributed to the public system should not 
receive its benefits.  
Our proposal would cover those younger than age 55 at the time the plan 
first goes into effect.14 For example, if the income tax surcharge begins in 2008, 
it would apply only to those born after 1953. Older adults would not be subject 
to the surcharge, and they would continue to rely on the current system of 
Medicaid, Medicare Part A, private long-term care insurance, and out-of-pocket 
payments to meet their long-term care needs. Since very few people purchase 
private long-term care insurance before age 55, our plan would exclude almost 
all adults who already have private coverage. Persons with disabilities who 
qualify for Medicare before age 65 could begin to receive Medicaid Part E 
benefits five years after the tax surcharge begins.  
Our plan would give adults aged 55 to 59 at the time the plan is first 
implemented the option of enrolling in Medicare Part E. However, they would 
face higher income tax surcharge rates than younger individuals. Instead of a 
one percentage point income tax surcharge, those age 55 when the plan began 
would be subject to a 2 percentage point surcharge for the rest of their lives (or 
until they no longer receive enough taxable income to pay federal income 
taxes). The surcharge would increase by one-third of a percentage point for 
each yearly birth cohort, until age 59. Thus, those aged 57 when the plan began 
would face an income tax surcharge of 2.67 percentage points if they elect to 
participate in Medicare Part E, while those age 59 would face a surcharge of 
3.33 percentage points.15 Including this voluntary transition group would add 
                                         
 
14 Special transition rules would need to be developed for older people married to younger spouses. A 65-
year- old taxpayer would be exempt from the tax during the transition period, whereas her younger 
spouse would be subject to it. Since income tax is calculated based on joint income, this creates a 
complication. One possible solution would be to average the tax rate that would apply to each spouse. 
Thus the couple just described would pay a 0.5 percent tax rate and only the younger spouse would be 
covered. 
15 Because Part A of Medicare is funded primarily on a pay- as- you- go basis, with today’s taxpayers 
financing benefits for today’s older adults, the Hospital Insurance payroll tax rates could not be lowered 
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 complexity to the proposal, because the IRS would have to make sure that 
individuals who had opted into Medicare Part E paid a higher tax for the rest of 
their lives. 
Strengths and Limitations of Our Proposal  
We believe our proposal to reform the long-term-care financing system has a 
number of important advantages. It provides coverage for comprehensive long-
term care services, including home care, for all Americans with disabilities who 
qualify for Medicare. It reduces distortions between the choice of home- and 
institutional-based care by covering both service modalities at the same rate. To 
keep program costs down, our proposal requires cost sharing by beneficiaries, 
but also provides protections for low-income adults. It insures individuals and 
families against the risk of catastrophic expenses after the onset of frailty, and 
protects the assets of those who need care. As a result, it substantially reduces 
the implicit tax on savings caused by current Medicaid rules, and may 
encourage more Americans to save for their old age.  
By relying on a surcharge on federal income taxes, our plan distributes 
the burden of financing the proposed expansion of the Medicare program 
widely across the population. Unlike a payroll tax, it does not exempt nonwage 
income from taxation. Yet it shields from additional taxes low-income adults 
and families with the least ability to pay. By creating a mandatory program that 
requires all taxpayers to contribute to the cost of financing long-term care 
services, our proposal eliminates the free rider problem inherent in a voluntary 
private insurance program. It also avoids raising taxes on most people who 
currently receive subsidized long-term care from Medicaid. And it could 
provide important budgetary relief for state governments, which now spend 
                                                                                                                                 
immediately after the creation of Part E. For the same reasons, we also do not anticipate that funds could 
be moved out of the Part A trust fund.  
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 about one-sixth of their budgets on Medicaid. Alternatively, it could help reduce 
the long-term imbalances in the Medicare program. 
The proposal would raise national savings two ways. First, it would 
eliminate the strong disincentives to save created by the existence of highly 
subsidized long-term care services under Medicaid and the asset spend-down 
rules to qualify for those services. Second, by advance funding future long-term 
care costs via a trust fund that is invested in private nongovernmental assets, 
the proposal would directly increase national savings (assuming that the trust 
fund is not offset by larger public deficits). Higher national saving would 
improve the nation’s ability to cope with the long-run fiscal imbalances that will 
start with the retirement of the baby boom generation. 
However, our plan does not solve every problem confronting the way in 
which we now finance long-term care in this country. For one thing, our 
proposal does very little to help the current cohort of older Americans pay their 
long-term care bills. Because we phase in our program slowly over time, and the 
oldest potential participants are currently less than 60 years old, it will take 
about 20 years for the plan to have a major impact on the way in which long-
term care services are financed. In the meantime, those in need of long-term 
care would continue to run the risk of catastrophic long-term care expenses 
and the loss of a lifetime of savings. If implemented quickly, however, our plan 
would provide mandatory coverage for half of baby boomers and optional 
coverage for most of them. The real long-term care crisis will not emerge until 
about 2030, when disability rates are likely to surge within this large cohort of 
Americans, born between 1946 and 1964 (Knickman and Snell 2002).  
Another potential problem with our plan is that it will hurt the private 
insurance industry. If enacted, our proposal would gradually eliminate the 
market for private long-term care insurance, a rapidly growing product for an 
influential industry. The industry’s opposition could impede efforts to 
implement the plan. In principle, a system of private insurance could be 
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 designed along the lines of this plan. The federal government could make an 
annual payment to the insurer of choice, ideally with adjustments for 
difference in health status and thus expected utilization. The long-term care 
insurance industry would have to invent a system of totally portable insurance 
with protection from health care cost inflation, guaranteed issue and 
renewability, and a uniform set of minimum benefits. An accurate form of risk 
assessment would be necessary to deter cherry-picking, by which insurers cover 
the lowest risk persons to maximize profits.  
The principal political drawback of our proposal may be that it calls for a 
substantial expansion of a public program and an income tax surcharge at a 
time when many have concerns about the size of the public sector and the 
burden of federal taxes. The recent trend has been to cut taxes, not increase 
them. In addition, the expansion of Medicare to include coverage of 
prescription drugs may complicate efforts to add comprehensive long-term 
care services to Medicare. Given concerns about Medicare’s long-term financial 
health, lawmakers may be reluctant to embrace another expansion of the 
program to cover even more services. 
 24 
 References 
AARP. 2003. “Beyond 50 2003: A Report to the Nation on Independent Living 
and Disability.” Washington, DC: AARP. 
America’s Health Insurance Plans. 2004. “Long-Term Care Insurance in 2002.” 
Washington, DC: America’s Health Insurance Plans. 
Arno, Peter S., Carol Levine, and Margaret M. Memmott. 1999. “The Economic 
Value of Informal Caregiving.” Health Affairs 18(2): 182–88. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2006. “Personal Income and Its Disposition.” 
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=58&
FirstYear=2004&LastYear=2006&Freq=Qtr.  
Burman, Leonard, Elaine Maag, and Jeffrey Rohaly. 2002. “The Effect of the 
2001 Tax Cut on Low- and Middle-Income Families and Children.” Tax 
Policy Discussion Paper No. 1. Washington, DC: Tax Policy Center. 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 2006. Health Care Financing 
Review: Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement, 2004. Baltimore, 
MD: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
———. 2007. “HCBS Waivers Section 1915(c).” Baltimore, MD: Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidStWaivProgDemoPGI/05_HCBSWaivers-
Section1915(c).asp.  
CMS. See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
Cohen, Marc A., Maurice Weinrobe, and Jessica Miller. 2002. “Inflation 
Protection and Long-Term Care Insurance: Finding the Gold Standard of 
Adequacy.” AARP Public Policy Institute Report No. 2002-09. Washington, 
DC: AARP. 
Congressional Budget Office. 1999. “Projections of Expenditures for Long-Term 
Care Services for the Elderly.” CBO Memorandum. Washington, DC: 
Congressional Budget Office. 
———. 2004. “Financing Long-Term Care for the Elderly.” Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/54xx/doc5400/04-26-LongTermCare.pdf.  
———. 2005. The Long-Term Budget Outlook. Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office.  
Feder, Judith, Harriet L. Komisar, and Marlene Niefeld. 2000. “Long-Term Care 
in the United States: An Overview.” Health Affairs 19(3): 40–56. 
 25 
 Freedman, Vicki A., Eileen Crimmins, Robert F. Schoeni, Brenda C. Spillman, 
Hakan Aykan, Ellen Kramarow, Kenneth Land, James Lubitz, Kenneth 
Manton, Linda G. Martin, Diane Shinberg, and Timothy Waidmann. 2004. 
“Resolving Inconsistencies in Trends in Old-Age Disability: Report from a 
Technical Working Group.” Demography 41(3): 417–41. 
Gale, William G., and Jeffrey Rohaly. 2003. “Three-Quarters of Filers Pay More in 
Payroll Taxes Than in Income Taxes.” Washington, DC: The Urban–
Brookings Tax Policy Center. 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/commentary/taxfacts/payroll_income.pd
f.  
General Accounting Office. 2000. “Long-Term Care Insurance: Better 
Information Critical to Prospective Purchasers.” Testimony Before the 
Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate. Report No. GAO/T-HEHS-00-196. 
Washington, DC: General Accounting Office.  
Government Accountability Office. 2005. “Long-Term Care Financing: Growing 
Demand and Cost of Services Are Straining Federal and State Budgets.” 
GAO-05-564T. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office. 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05564t.pdf. 
Hubbard, R. Glenn, Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen P. Zeldes. 1995. 
“Precautionary Savings and Social Insurance.” Journal of Political Economy 
103(3): 360–99. 
Johnson, Richard W., and Cori E. Uccello. 2005. “Is Private Long-Term Care 
Insurance the Answer?” Issue in Brief No. 29. Chestnut Hill, MA: Center 
for Retirement Research at Boston College. 
http://www.bc.edu/centers/crr/ib_29.shtml. 
Johnson, Richard W., and Joshua M. Wiener. 2006. “A Profile of Frail Older 
Americans and Their Caregivers.” Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. 
http://www.urban.org/publications/311284.html.  
Kassner, Enid, and Lee Shirey. 2000. “Medicaid Financial Eligibility for Older 
People: State Variations in Access to Home and Community-Based Waiver 
and Nursing Home Services.” AARP Public Policy Institute Report No. 
2000-06. Washington, DC: AARP. 
Knickman, James R., and Emily K. Snell. 2002. “The 2030 Problem: Caring for 
Aging Baby Boomers.” Health Services Research 37(4): 849–84. 
Komisar, Harriet L., and Lee Shirey Thompson. 2007. “National Spending for 
Long-Term Care.” Washington, DC: Georgetown University Long-Term 
Care Financing Project. 
http://ltc.georgetown.edu/pdfs/natspendfeb07.pdf.  
 26 
 Levit, Katharine, Cynthia Smith, Cathy Cowan, Helen Lazenby, and Anne Martin. 
2002. “Inflation Spurs Health Spending in 2000.” Health Affairs 21(1): 
172–81. 
LifePlans, Inc. 2000. “Who Buys Long-Term Care Insurance in 2000: A Decade of 
Study of Buyers and Nonbuyers.” Washington, DC: Health Insurance 
Association of America.  
LoSasso, Anthony T., and Richard W. Johnson. 2002. “Does Informal Care From 
Adult Children Reduce Nursing Home Admissions for the Elderly?” 
Inquiry 39(3): 279–97. 
Lutzky, Steven, John Corea, and Lisa Alecxih. 2000. “A Survey of Employers 
Offering Group Long-Term Care Insurance to Their Employees.” Final 
Report to the Office of Disability, Aging, and Long-Term Care Policy, U.S. 
Dept. of Health and Human Services. 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/ltcinsfr.htm. 
Manton, Kenneth G., and XiLiang Gu. 2001. “Changes in the Prevalence of 
Chronic Disability in the United States Black and Nonblack Population 
Above Age 65 From 1982 to 1999.” Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences 98(11): 6354–59. 
MEDPAC. 2006. “A Data Book: Healthcare Spending and the Medicare Program.” 
Washington, DC: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. 
http://medpac.gov/publications/ 
congressional_reports/Jun06DataBook_Entire_report.pdf.  
MetLife Mature Market Institute. 2006. “MetLife Market Survey of Nursing Home 
and Home Care Costs.” New York: Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. 
http://www.metlife.com/WPSAssets/21052872211163445734V1F2006NH
HCMarketSurvey.pdf. 
Moon, Marilyn, Niall Brennan, and Misha Segal. 1998. “Options for Aiding Low-
Income Medicare Beneficiaries.” Inquiry 35: 346–56. 
Mui, Ada C. 1995. “Caring for Frail Elderly Parents: A Comparison of Sons and 
Daughters.” The Gerontologist 35(1): 86–93. 
National Association of State Budget Officers. 2006. Fiscal Year 2005 State 
Expenditure Report. Washington, DC: National Association of State Budget 
Officers. 
http://www.nasbo.org/Publications/PDFs/2005%20State%20Expenditure%
20Report.pdf. 
Norton, Edward C., and Virender Kumar. 2000. “The Long-Run Effect of the 
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act.” Inquiry 37(2): 173-87. 
 27 
 Poisal, John A., Christopher Truffer, Sheila Smith, Andrea Sisko, Cathy Cowan, 
Sean Keehan, Bridget Dickensheets, and the National Health Expenditure 
Accounts Projections Team. 2007. “Health Spending Projections Through 
2016: Modest Changes Obscure Part D’s Impact.” Health Affairs Web 
Exclusive w242-53. 
Smith, Vernon, Eileen Ellis, Kathy Gifford, Rekha Ramesh, and Victoria Wachino. 
2002. Medicaid Spending Growth: Results From a 2002 Survey. 
Washington, DC: The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. 
Social Security Administration. 2006. Income of the Population 55 or Older, 
2004. Washington, DC: Social Security Administration. 
Summer, Laura. 2007. “Medicaid and Long-Term Care.” Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Long-Term Care Financing Project. 
http://ltc.georgetown.edu/pdfs/medicaid2006.pdf. 
Tax Policy Center. 2007. “Personal Exemption and Standard Deduction 2001–
2007.” 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/TaxFacts/TFDB/TFTemplate.cfm?Docid=
389. 
Tilly, Jane, Susan Goldenson, and Jessica Kasten. 2001. “Long-Term Care: 
Consumers, Providers, and Financing.” Washington, DC: The Urban 
Institute. 
U.S. Census Bureau. 2000. “Projections of the Total Resident Population by 5-
Year Age Groups, and Sex with Special Age Categories: Middle Series, 
2025 to 2045.” 
http://www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/summary/np-t3-
f.pdf.  
Wiener, Joshua M., Catherine M. Sullivan, and Jason Skaggs. 1996. “Spending 
Down to Medicaid: New Data On the Role of Medicaid in Paying for 
Nursing Home Care.” AARP Public Policy Institute Report No. 9607. 
Washington, DC: American Association of Retired Persons. 
 28 
 Tables 
Lowest Quintile 9.1 2 0.0 0.1
Second Quintile 46.6 38 -0.2 2.1
Middle Quintile 81.0 147 -0.5 7.9
Fourth Quintile 96.7 344 -0.7 18.5
Top Quintile 98.7 1,323 -0.9 71.4
All 66.4 371 -0.7 100.0
Addendum
Top 10 Percent 99.3 2,106 -1.0 56.8
Top 5 Percent 99.2 3,387 -1.0 45.7
Top 1 Percent 99.2 10,196 -1.1 27.5
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 1006-1).
(2) Tax units with negative cash income are excluded from the lowest income class but are included 
in the totals. For a description of cash income, see 
(3) For the income levels at each quintile and the top income percentiles used in this table, see 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/TaxModel/percentiles.cfm
(4) Includes both filing and non-filing units but excludes those that are dependents of other tax units.
Table 1
Distribution of One Percentage Point Individual Income Tax Surcharge
Fully Phased in, by Cash Income Percentile, 2007 1
(5) After-tax income is cash income less: individual income tax net of refundable credits; corporate 
income tax; payroll taxes (Social Security and Medicare); and estate tax.
Cash Income Percentile2,3
Percent of 
Tax Units 
with Tax 
Increase4
Average Tax 
Change ($)
Percent of 
After-Tax 
Income5
Share of 
Total 
Federal Tax 
Change
(1) Calendar year.  Baseline is current law.  Proposal would increase individual income tax rates 
from 10, 15, 25, 28, 33, and 35 percent to 11, 16, 26, 29, 34, and 36 percent.  Alternative minimum 
tax rates would increase from 26 and 28 percent to 27 and 29 percent.  Rates on long-term capital 
gains and qualifying dividends would increase from 15 to 16 percent (from 5 percent to 6 percent 
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 Lowest Quintile 0.9 0 0.6 0.0
Second Quintile 18.1 12 1.9 1.2
Middle Quintile 41.7 55 3.7 3.6
Fourth Quintile 92.1 299 14.3 19.9
Top Quintile 98.1 1,362 79.3 75.3
All 42.7 264 100.0 100.0
Addendum
Top 10 Percent 99.1 2,172 66.9 60.1
Top 5 Percent 99.0 3,194 57.4 50.3
Top 1 Percent 99.7 8,670 37.3 31.8
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 1006-1).
(4) Includes both filing and non-filing units but excludes those that are dependents of other tax units.
(5) After-tax income is cash income less: individual income tax net of refundable credits; corporate income 
tax; payroll taxes (Social Security and Medicare); and estate tax.
Share of 
Total 
Federal Tax 
Change
(1) Calendar year.  Baseline is current law.  Proposal would increase individual income tax rates from 10, 
15, 25, 28, 33, and 35 percent to 11, 16, 26, 29, 34, and 36 percent.  Alternative minimum tax rates would 
increase from 26 and 28 percent to 27 and 29 percent.  Rates on long-term capital gains and qualifying 
dividends would increase from 15 to 16 percent (from 5 percent to 6 percent for lower-income taxpayers). 
(2) Tax units with negative cash income are excluded from the lowest income class but are included in the 
totals. For a description of cash income, see http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/TaxModel/income.cfm
(3) For the income levels at each quintile and the top income percentiles used in this table, see 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/TaxModel/percentiles.cfm
Cash Income Percentile2,3
Percent of 
Tax Units 
with Tax 
Increase4
Average Tax 
Change ($)
Percent of 
After-Tax 
Income5
Table 2
Distribution of One Percentage Point Individual Income Tax Surcharge
Tax Units with Head Aged 65 and Over
Fully Phased in, by Cash Income Percentile, 2007 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
